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Abstract
Current explanation techniques towards a trans-
parent Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
mainly focuses on building connections between
the human-understandable input features with
models’ prediction, overlooking an alternative
representation of the input, the frequency compo-
nents decomposition. In this work, we present an
analysis of the connection between the distribu-
tion of frequency components in the input dataset
and the reasoning process the model learns from
the data. We further provide quantification anal-
ysis about the contribution of different frequency
components toward the model’s prediction. We
show that the vulnerability of the model against
tiny distortions is a result of the model is rely-
ing on the high-frequency features, the target fea-
tures of the adversarial (black and white-box) at-
tackers, to make the prediction. We further show
that if the model develops stronger association
between the low-frequency component with true
labels, the model is more robust, which is the ex-
planation of why adversarially trained models are
more robust against tiny distortions.
1. Introduction
The gap between human’s understanding and the logic be-
hind Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are receiving more at-
tention as DNNs show competitive inference power in areas
where humans used to be indispensable, e.g. medical diag-
nosis, auto-piloting, and credit systems. Entrusting users
by explaining models’ behavior becomes as necessary as
promoting the performance. Explanations of deep neural
networks tend to provide human-understandable descrip-
tions about models’ behaviors. Recent work of explana-
tions focuses on associating importance of input features
either to the model’s output (e.g. Karpathy et al. (2015),
Sundararajan et al. (2017), Selvaraju et al. (2019)) or to the
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distribution of data with which the model is trained (e.g.
Koh & Liang (2017), Yeh et al. (2018), Leino et al. (2018));
Among all behaviors of deep models, the robustness draws
increasing attentions due to the security and fairness con-
cerns. Current discussion of models’ robustness focuses on
the capacity of defending adversarial attacks which aims to
fool the deep models with similar input but the change is
in-perceptional to humans(Szegedy et al., 2013). Different
adversarial attacks, though varying in the adversarial loss
and updating rules, have been proved to successfully fool
the most of deep models. (Szegedy et al. (2013), Goodfel-
low et al. (2014), Kurakin et al. (2016), Carlini & Wagner
(2017), Papernot et al. (2016)).
Besides the work that aims to generate more robust model
against existing attacks (Madry et al. (2017), Shafahi et al.
(2019)) or a certifiable robust mechanism(Cohen et al.
(2019)), the community starts to explain why the deep
model tends to be more vulnerable and tries to understand
what is behind the adversarial attacks.(Madry et al., 2017)
concludes that a robust model tends to be more complex
than the standard trained model and Ilyas et al. (2019)
shows that adversarial examples can be treated as an in-
put full of non-robust features, which are poorly correlated
to the labels. Models can still have good performance and
generalizations by only learning the non-robust features but
will become vulnerable against various attacks.
However, the community may overlook another facet of in-
put data – the distribution of frequency components. Treat-
ing inputs as signals in Rn space, we can decompose them
into basis signals of diverse frequencies. While humans
may only respond to a specific range of frequencies, DNNs
are capable of using information from all frequencies. In
this paper, we build the bridge between the model’s robust-
ness with the distribution of frequency components in the
input set. Our major contributions are:
• We prove that when the distortion is measured
with `1 distance, perturbing high-frequency compo-
nents causes smaller change compared with the low-
frequency components.
• We show that, for many existing adversarial attacks,
there are more distortions in the high-frequency com-
ponents.
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• We propose, Occluded Frequency, our measurement
of the contribution of each frequency component to-
wards the prediction and we further show that robust
models are usually less relied on the high-frequency
components in the input; therefore, they are more ro-
bust.
2. Background and Related Work
Besides in the original feature space, several works pro-
vide new insights into the CNN behaviors from the aspect
in the frequency domain. Wang et al. (2019) shows that
unlike human beings, high-frequency components play sig-
nificant roles in promoting CNN’s accuracy. Adopting in-
formation from high-frequency components may cause the
model to form very different concepts in learning as hu-
mans do. By observing adversarial defended models, Wang
et al. (2019) concludes that smoothing the CNN kernels
helps to enforce the model to use features of low frequen-
cies. While the conclusion remains questionable due to
the lack of theoretical proof is discussed, the paper pro-
poses a novel view of attributing the frequencies compo-
nents to the model’s predictions. An alternative view of un-
derstanding the importance of frequency components is to
observe a model’s behavior when specific frequency com-
ponents are modified. This area is studied known as the
frequency components analysis on adversarial examples.
Guo et al. (2018) proposes an adversarial attack only tar-
geting the low-frequency components in an image, which
shows that the model does utilize the features in the low-
frequency domains for predictions instead of only learn-
ing from high-frequency components. Sharma et al. (2019)
demonstrated that state-of-the-art defenses are nearly as
vulnerable as undefended models under low-frequency per-
turbations, which implies current defense techniques are
only valid against adversarial attack in the high-frequency
domain. On the other side, (Rahaman et al., 2018) shows
that ReLU networks tend to learn low-frequency featuers
first and then pick up the high-frequency components later.
2.1. Notation and Preliminary
We first introduce the notation we are going to use in the
rest of the paper.
Notation A deep neural network y = argmaxc fc(x) that
takes an input x ∈ Rd and outputs a prediction class y. For
simplicity, we omit the bold font and denote the input as
x. We denote the `p norm as || · ||p. The Discrete Fourier
Transform of x is denoted as X = F(x) (discussion to
follow).
Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) By convolution with a
series of complex-valued exponential functions, DFT trans-
forms a finite signal into the a complex-valued function of
frequency. DFT is widely used in signal processing to an-
alyze the frequency components for signals and human are
more perceptional to the low frequency components in the
signal, e.g. the content of image, while less perceptional
to the high-frequency patterns, e.g. noise and small per-
turbations. Computing DFT requires dealing with complex
function and we avoid this by introducing Discrete Cosine
Transform in the real implementation but the analysis is
still under DFT (Bracewell & Newbold, 1986).
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) DCT is similar to the
discrete Fourier transform: it transforms a signal or image
from the spatial domain to the frequency domain, but only
maintaining the real part. The difference is the basis func-
tion: DFT uses complex exponential functions while the
DCT uses real-valued cosine functions (Narasimha & Pe-
terson, 1978). In the analysis part, we use DFT to demon-
strate the motivations and methods while for the experi-
ments we will replace DFT with DCT due to the imaginary
components of DCT will bring extra computational com-
plexity.
2.2. Adversarial Attacks
An adversarial attack tries to find a neighbor of an input
x whose prediction is different from x but the change is
in-perceptional to humans, causing failure in the reason-
ing. We introduce a few representative adversarial attack
algorithms and methods. We discuss the three white-box
attacks to be evaluated in this paper. Goodfellow et al.
(2014) proposes FGSM attack, a heuristic searching for
the adversarial examples following the sign of adversarial
directions with a baby step at each time. It is usually done
in the `∞ space by clipping the value outside the user-
defined pixel range. Unlike FGSM, PGD (Madry et al.,
2017) projects the adversarial samples learned from each
iteration into the `p ball of the original input, therefore, the
adversarial perturbation size is than the maximum allowed
perturbation. CW attack Carlini & Wagner (2017) refor-
malizes the adversarial loss to ensure that the solution to the
optimization is close to the global optimal. They also solve
the perturbation in the tanh space to yield the smoothness
of the gradient signal. Besides the white-box attacks, we
are also interested in the black-box attack and we include
SimBA (Guo et al., 2019) in this paper. Under untargeted
attack mode, SimBA tries to add a random perturbation on
the input image at each step, and accept the perturbation if
it decreases prediction certainty on the correct label.
3. Adversarial attack analysis in frequency
domain
The discussion of robustness is caused by the introduction
of adversarial attacks and then the vulnerability comes into
the attention. In the time domain, e.g. the image, adversar-
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ial perturbations are usually hard to discovered by humans
since they are designed to have very small `p norms. It is
natural to believe the adversarial perturbations do not dis-
tort the low-frequency components in the image but more
like a change in the high-frequency pattern. We verify this
hypothesis by introducing the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Lower Bound of Input Perturbation)
Given an input x and a perturbed input x′, the distor-
tion measured in the `1 space is lower bounded by the
corresponding lowest frequency components. Formally,
||x− x′||1 ≥ |X0 −X ′0| (1)
Proof : We first write down the DFTX = F(x) of an given
input x and the inverse DFT x = F−1(X).
Xk = F(x)k =
d−1∑
i=0
xie
−j 2pid ki
xi = F−1(X)i = 1
d
d−1∑
k=0
Xke
j 2pid ki
(2)
where j =
√−1 and d is the dimension of x. And we also
introduce Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The finite sum of complex-valued exponential
series can be written as
d−1∑
i=0
ejix =
1− ejdx
1− ejx =
−eidx/2(e−jdx/2−ejdx/2)
−ejx/2(e−jx/2 − ejx/2)
=
sin(dx/2)
sin(x/2)
ejx(d−1)/2
(3)
Let x = 2piN k then we have the Fourier basis, so
d−1∑
n=0
ej
2pi
d ki =
sin(pik)
sin(pid k)
ejkpi
d−1
d (4)
Observe that
∑d−1
n=0 e
j 2pid ki = d if k = 0 and 0 otherwise.
Eventually, we prove the Prop 1
||x− x′||1 =
d−1∑
i=0
|xi − x′i|
=
d−1∑
i=0
|F−1(X)i −F−1(X ′)i|
=
d−1∑
i=0
|1
d
d−1∑
k=0
Xke
j 2pid ki − 1
d
d−1∑
k=0
X ′ke
j 2pid ki|
=
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|
d−1∑
k=0
(Xk −X ′k)ej
2pi
d ki|
≥ 1
d
|
d−1∑
i=0
d−1∑
k=0
(Xk −X ′k)ej
2pi
d ki|
=
1
d
|
d−1∑
k=0
(Xk −X ′k)
d−1∑
i=0
ej
2pi
d ki|
= |X0 −X ′0| (Use Lemma 1)
(5)
Observation of Prop. 1 Perturbation applied to the in-
put can be viewed either to a subset of features in the
time domain or in the frequency domain by transforming
the perturbation with DFT or DCT. For the same amount
of perturbation measured by spectral energy in the fre-
quency domain, Prop. 1 shows that only the perturbation
towards the low-frequency components will increase the
lower bound of the same perturbation applied in the time
domain. Therefore, attacking the low-frequency compo-
nents of the input tends to cause higher distortion in the
time domain due to the increase of lower bound, while the
high-frequency distortion does not change the lower bound.
As long as we require the distortion as small as possible in
the time domain, an attacker should aim for mess up the
high-frequency components instead of the low-frequency
part, which matches our intuitions that adversarial pertur-
bations tends to be not perceptional to human.
As the perturbation in the input space tends to happen to
the high-frequency components, if we minimize the corre-
lation between the model’s decision and the use of high-
frequency features, we should be able to force the attacker
to make greater distortions than before. In the other word,
the model will be more robust. To validate the proposition
from empirical results, we propose a new way to measure
the contribution of each frequency components towards the
prediction.
3.1. Contribution of Frequency Components
Towards the interpretation of feature importance, one of the
methods is attribution functions. Attribution functions aim
to assign a score for each feature in the input and higher
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Figure 1. Average Attribution scores for each frequency components on each subset of CIFAR-10. We compute the attribution scores on
three ResNet models: natural training (blue), Madry’s training with  = 0.25 in `2 space (orange) and Madry’s training with  = 0.5
in `2 space (green). Robust models tend to shift the high attribution scores from the high frequency range to the low frequency range,
compared to the naturally trained models. Better viewed in color.
scores reflect higher relevance of the particular features to-
wards the quantity of interest, e.g. the prediciton result of
the model. One of the attribution methods is Occlusion
(Zeiler & Fergus, 2013) that ablates a subset of features in
the input and assigns the importance score with the change
of output compared to the original input. Ablation is usu-
ally performed by replacing the features with random noise
or a baseline feature, e.g. zeros. We adapt the concept
of Occlusion into the frequency domain so that the attri-
bution score of each frequency component is computed by
the change of the output of the model. Formally, we pro-
pose Occluded Frequency as an attribution method for the
spectrum of input.
Definition 1 (Occluded Frequency (OF)) Given a model
y = f(x), a class of interest c, defineH(i) as a matrix with
the same shape of F(x) whose each entry hk is
hk = I[k = i]σ(F(x)k) + I[k 6= i]F(x)k (6)
where σ(·) is a function that transforms an frequency com-
ponent F(x)k to a baseline version, e.g. zeros or random
signal. Therefore, the occlusion score O(F(x)i) for fre-
quency component F(x)i towards class c is defined as
O(F(x)i) = f c(x)− f c(F−1(H(i))) (7)
where f c(·) is the logit score of class c.
Ablation with DCT To perform OF attribution on images
with DCT, the masking is performed from the top left cor-
ner to the right bottom following the direction of increasing
frequencies. All components with the same frequencies are
ablated at the same time.
Why Not Use Gradient Another intuitive choise is to use
the gradient-based attribution methods (Simonyan et al.,
2013; Sundararajan et al., 2017; Shrikumar et al., 2017)
to find the feature importance. However, gradient-based
methods are shown to be non-robust and can cause con-
tradictory results for tiny perturbations (Ghorbani et al.,
2017). We find the ablation-based attributions are more
consistent empirically, therefore, the result is more trust-
worth.
4. Experiment
In this section, we will use the retrained ResNet-50 (He
et al., 2015) to perform classification on CIFAR-10. For
the robust model, we use pretrained model with adversarial
examples1 (Engstrom et al., 2019).
Experiment I: natural→ adversarial
We first show the frequency domain of the adversarial ex-
amples generated by all methods mentioned in Sec 2.1. For
PGD and FGSM, we clip the distortion in the `∞ ball with
the maximum allowed perturbation 0.15. In CW attack,
we project the distortion in the `2 ball. For SimBA, we
used step size of 0.2 and we clip the distortion in the l∞
ball with the maximum allowed perturbation 0.2. All the
attacks are untargetted. The effect of adversarial attacks
1Weights: https://github.com/MadryLab/robustness
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in the frequency domain for input is analyzed by calculat-
ing average Relative Change in discrete cosine Transforms
(RCT) of an input x and its perturbed image x′.
RCT =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|DCT(x
′
i)− DCT(xi)
DCT(xi)
| (8)
where DCT(x) is discrete cosine transform of input x and
N is the number of samples in the dataset. We evaluate 200
images from CIFAR-10 dataset on a pre-trained VGG-19
model and the result is show in Figure 2.
Fig 2 show that all adversarial attacks, regardless of the
white-box and the black-box, perturb images mostly at
middle and high frequencies and low frequency perturba-
tions are very small. This explains why perturbations are
not detected by human eye whereas most of the deep net-
work models give wrong predictions.
Figure 2. RCT maps for different adversarial attacks on 200 im-
ages from CIFAR-10. The upper left corner and the lower right
corner represent the lowest and highest frequency components in
the DCT space, respectively. The deeper color indicates a greater
change for a specific frequency component between the origi-
nal images and the adversarial examples. RCT maps show that
greater changes happen to the high frequency ranges.
Experiment II: natural→ robust
In this experiment, instead of finding the difference be-
tween a natural image with its adversarial counterpart, we
Figure 3. Frequency domain of the different between robust/non-
robust images and the starting images. The left one (a) is the
robust images and the right one (b) is the non-robust images
explore the difference between with its robust counterpart.
We use the definition of robust dataset introduced by (Ilyas
et al., 2019), which attempts to find a neighbor xr of the
original input x where the features in xr remains correlated
to the output within a certain maximum allowed perturba-
tion. We solve the following objective to find the robust
counterpart xr.
xr = argmin
xr
||g(xr)− g(x)||2 (9)
where x is the original image and g(·) is the mapping to
a representation layer. When g(·) is extraced from a ad-
versarially trained network, the generated dataset is ro-
bust. When the representation mapping g(·) is extracted
from the standard network, the generated dataset is non-
robust. The initial value for xr is an randomly selected
image from the dataset. We conducted this generation pro-
cess on the CIFAR-10 test dataset. We then show the differ-
ence in the Fourier domain between the robust counterpart
and the non-robust counterpart with each natural image,
respectively and the result is shown in Fig.3. The result
demonstrates that the robust counterpart is mostly different
from the original input in the low-frequency components
while the non-robust counterpart is different on the middle-
frequency components. Since the robust counterparts are
generated from a robust model, we can also draw conclu-
sions that a robust model only associates the low-frequency
features with the labels while a regular model does not
have a strong connection between the low-frequency fea-
tures and the label. Instead, it captures a lot more features
in the middle-frequency range.
Experiment III: Visualization of Contribution
We have shown comparison analysis in Experiment I &
II on the different behaviors in the frequency domain for
high-frequency features and low-frequency features. In this
experiment, we show numerical analysis to further differ-
entiate the behavior of high-frequency features and low-
frequency features.
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With the Occluded Frequency methods, we show an ex-
ample of computing the frequency attribution on an input
image in Cifar-10 which is correctly predicted in Fig 4.
We ablate each frequency components from the lowest to
the highest to create the bars of contributions on the Fre-
quency Attribution subplot. From the attribution scores, we
know that even we assume that the low-frequency compo-
nent has the strongest correlation with the label since high-
frequency components are in-perceptional to humans, it ac-
tually takes the less use of the low-frequency components
due to low attribution scores in the low-frequency range.
We visualize the modified image by OF at a particular fre-
quency. The second row shows image with the lowest, the
second lowest and the third lowest frequency components
ablated and the the third row shows the modified images
when the frequency components with the highest attribu-
tion scores are ablated (top1, top2 and top3 respectively).
It is very hard for human to capture the difference when the
frequency components with highest attribution scores are
ablated. A consequence of using features corresponding
to the middle and high-frequency range is that by manip-
ulating the middle and high-frequency features, we should
expect the change happens to the model’s prediction while
the human is still not aware of the change made on the in-
put. Images like this are usually considered as adversarial
examples.
Experiment IV: Attribution Shift
We further extent Experiment III to the entire dataset and
we compare the attribution scores of different frequency
components on a naturally trained ResNet model and ad-
versarial trained models. There are three robust models
trained with the maximum allowed perturbation of 0.25
and 0.5 in the `2 space and 8/255 in the `∞ space. The
result is shown in Fig 1. We plot the average attribu-
tion scores on each frequency component for all images in
the same classes since we assume images within the same
classes should have fewer nuances and more commonalities
compared to images of different classes. Despite the low-
est frequency component being the most important overall
models, Fig 1 shows that attribution scores on the middle
and high-frequency components tend to be zeros or very
low and the main share of the attribution scores are in the
low-frequency range. It can be seen as the robust model
shifts the main share of attribution scores towards the low-
frequency range, leaving middle and high-frequency com-
ponents as insignificant as possible.
Summary Finally, we summarize the findings from all ex-
periments. Middle and high-frequency components are the
target features for adversarial attackers since models may
or may not rely only on the low-frequency features to make
the prediction. Adversarial training can be viewed as a
frequency selector that the association between the input
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Figure 4. (First Row) Left: the input image. Middle: an example
of computing the attribution score for a specific frequency com-
ponent by ablating the frequency of interest with zeros. Right: the
attribution scores for all frequency components in the input on the
left. Higher scores denotes higher contribution to the prediction.
(Second and Third Row) The input image with the k − th lowest
frequency components are ablated. The values of k at the third
column are the components with the top1, top2 and top3 attribu-
tion scores.
and its prediction is more tight with low-frequency compo-
nents, leaving the high-frequency components less relevant
for the prediction; therefore, the attacker who aims on the
high-frequency features will fail.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, We first show a lower bound of the perturba-
tion applied to the image is related to the lowest frequency
components, the most perceptional frequency components
to human. We then verify that white-box and black-box at-
tackers mainly focus on the high-frequency components in
the clean images. We further propose Occluded Frequency
as an attribution method to quantify the contribution of dif-
ferent frequency components in the input. Based on the em-
pirical results on the entire dataset, we provide a frequency-
based explanation to answer why standard models are not
robust: low-frequency features are more robust than the
high-frequency features in the input space; therefore ro-
bust models are developed to be strongly related to the low-
frequency features while standard models rely more on the
high-frequency components to make the prediction.
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